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ABSTRACT
WILLIAM KINDRED WINECOFF: Pick Your Poison: Banking Regulations, Macroeconomic
Management, and Moral Hazard in OECD Economies
(Under the direction of Layna Mosley.)
This paper argues that banks operating in systems where monetary and regulatory authority are
unified in a central bank expect and receive preferential policies, and so act less prudently than
do banks in other systems. This moral hazard arises when the natural tension between counter-
cyclical monetary policy and pro-cyclical regulatory policy is relaxed. I test the hypothesis using
a time series cross-sectional econometric analysis of OECD countries from 1990-2007. The results
strongly support the claim that there is a relationship between prudential behaviors of banks
and the location of regulatory authority, and provides evidence that moral hazard exists when
regulatory and monetary authority are unified. I conclude by discussing the implications of the
analysis for governance at the domestic and international levels.
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Introduction
“At our board level, we never had a conversation, ever, that we should rely on the
government to do anything.”
– Jamie Dimon, Chairman and CEO of JPMorgan Chase, in testimony before the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission of the United States Congress, January 13, 2010.
Policy makers must choose whether to give regulatory authority over the banking sector to
central banks or to a separate agency. This decision is important: financial crises have grown in
frequency and severity since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system (Bordo and Eichengreen
1999), and the recent crisis that originated in the subprime mortgage sector in the United States
is “likely to be judged the most virulent global financial crisis ever” (Greenspan 2010). The
average fiscal cost of recoveries from financial crises is about 13% of GDP, and the average
output loss is about 20% of GDP (Laeven and Valencia 2008). Policy makers operating in this
economic environment must maximize the stability of their banking sectors without choking off
economic growth. Failure to achieve one goal or the other will adversely affect their chances of
remaining in office.
Policy makers may choose to locate regulatory authority in central banks. Central banks
manage macroeconomies by controlling the money supply through interest rate adjustments and
open market operations. These policy tools affect the cost of funds available to banks, which then
affects the cost of funds available to businesses and consumers. Since monetary policy works
on the macroeconomy indirectly, with banks as intermediaries between the central bank and
the macroeconomy, a healthy banking sector is a prerequisite for central banks to be effective
in promoting economic growth (Schumpeter 1911; King and Levine 1993). As a technocratic
institution at the center of the financial industry, a central bank has the requisite knowledge to
regulate the banking sector in ways that improve economic performance.
By unifying regulatory authority and monetary authority in a central bank, policy makers
may intend to address two policy goals – strong macroeconomic performance and financial stabil-
ity – with one stroke. But macroeconomic and regulatory policy goals are in tension. Standard
monetary policy is counter-cyclical: central banks expand the money supply when an economy is
sluggish, and restrict money growth when an economy begins to over-heat and inflationary pres-
sures mount. Prudential regulatory policies such as minimum capital adequacy ratios (CAR),
which require banks to maintain a minimum level of capital as protection against default risk in
their asset portfolios, are pro-cyclical. A slowdown in economic activity leads to an increase in
defaults, which adversely affects bank earnings and erodes its capital base. In this environment
banks must take action to boost their capital base or risk liquidation. Banks can improve their
capital ratios by issuing new equity, selling assets, borrowing from the government, and scaling
back issuance of new loans. In other words, banks protect against insolvency by decreasing
normal banking activities. Such actions can lead to a self-perpetuating pro-cyclical pattern,
whereby banks decrease lending, which further depresses an economy, leading to more defaults
and a corresponding decline in capital ratios.
A study by Federal Reserve economists put it this way: “So long as bank rating systems are
responsive to changes in borrower default risk, capital requirements will tend to increase as an
economy falls into recession and fall as an economy enters an expansion. To the extent that
banks curtail (expand) lending in response, recessions (expansions) will be amplified” (Gordy
and Howells 2006). Thus, by restricting bank activity when it is most needed to spur economic
activity, pro-cyclical regulatory policies present an obstacle for policy makers in managing their
national economies.
Copelovitch and Singer (2008) highlight this tension between macroeconomic and regulatory
goals, and claim that “the presence of regulatory responsibility in the central bank’s institutional
mandate introduces an important bias into its monetary policymaking calculus”. Because their
mandate includes conflicting aims, they argue, at the margin regulatory central banks must
choose to privilege one policy goal over another. Faced with this choice, they are that regulatory
central banks will pursue policies that emphasize bank stability over price stability by allowing
higher inflation, which is associated with bank profitability. The implication from their analysis
is that while regulatory central banks trade off some macroeconomic performance by allowing
higher inflation, the financial system will be more stable as a result. They conclude by asking,
“Are central banks more stringent bank regulators than stand-alone regulatory agencies? This
question is beyond the scope of the literature on the political economy of monetary policy, but
nonetheless important for the expanding literature on comparative financial regulation.”
This paper offers theoretical and empirical answers to that question. I argue that the same
policymaking bias that leads regulatory central banks to tolerate higher inflation than nonregu-
latory central banks also restricts their ability to serve as a strict regulator of banks. Specifically,
I claim that the fact that regulatory central banks privilege the needs of the banking sector more
than nonregulatory central banks creates moral hazard: if banks expect preferential policies from
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regulatory central banks, then they will take fewer steps to insure themselves against default risk.
This, in turn, makes a banking sector more susceptible to crisis, and increases the likelihood that
government support of the financial sector will become necessary. Therefore, unifying macroeco-
nomic and regulatory authority in central banks contributes to financial instability in avoidable
ways.
Fig. 1: Mean CAR and Location of Regulatory Authority
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Figure 1 provides a glimpse of the relationship between capital adequacy ratios (CAR) and
location of regulatory authority in OECD economies over time. CAR are a common measure
of banks’ precautions against default risk, and have been largely harmonized among advanced
economies by the Basel Accords. At nearly every point in the time series, mean CAR are lower
in states with regulatory central banks, meaning that those banks are less capable of absorbing
defaults while remaining solvent. This relationship persists over the sample period, although the
gap tightened beginning in the late-1990s1 . The theory developed below argues that the gap
is attributable to the moral hazard which exists when monetary and regulatory authority are
unified.
By focusing on how institutional mandates affect policy outcomes, this paper contributes to
two theoretical literatures. First, the previous political economy literature on banking regulation
has focused on how domestic political institutions affect the creation of regulatory standards,
or on principal-agent dynamics between regulatory institutions and governments, but has not
1 This tightening is perhaps attributable to the accession to the European economic and monetary union of
40% of OECD countries during that period. I explore that question in greater detail below.
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taken a close look at how different regulatory arrangements shape the incentives banks face2 .
Discussion of the effects of regulations on bank behaviors has been mostly implicit, if not absent
entirely. By directly examining how the location of regulatory authority affects the incentive
structure of banks, we may gain greater insight on the tradeoffs that policy makers face.
Second, by focusing on conflicting mandates associated with unification of macroeconomic
and regulatory authority this analysis also contributes to the literature on central banking.
Specifically, it qualifies the claim that independent central banks can correct time-inconsistency
problems by restricting the ability of policy makers to trade off long-term goals for short-term
political ends3 . If regulatory central banks create moral hazard, and if this leads to less prudent
behavior in the private financial sector, then those systems may be more susceptible in the
longer-run to more frequent or more severe financial crises and the enormous resulting costs.
The article proceeds as follows: in the next section I discuss how the tension between macroe-
conomic and regulatory goals provides reasons for some states to unify authority in a single insti-
tution and how this creates moral hazard. This discussion leads to specific hypotheses about the
effects of the location of regulatory authority on bank behaviors. In the following section I test
those hypotheses empirically by performing a time series cross-sectional econometric analysis of
bank actions in 30 OECD countries from 1990-2007. I discuss the results of these tests, and
conclude with a discussion of possible policy implications and ideas for further research.
Policy Tension and the Creation of Moral Hazard
Regulators are in a principal-agent relationship with governments; they must maintain fi-
nancial stability or risk the removal of their authority (Singer 2007). This threat is real. As a
response to the public and private costs of exposure to the subprime financial crisis, the United
Kingdom announced plans to abolish its primary financial regulator, the Financial Services Au-
thority, and give its authority to the Bank of England by 2012. This observation does not
imply that all regulators are in the same principal-agent relationship with governments, how-
ever. When regulatory authority is located separately from monetary authority, each agency will
pursue its mandate and the tension between the counter-cyclical monetary goals and pro-cyclical
regulatory goals is strengthened. When regulatory and monetary authority are unified, the need
2 For a discussion of how electoral rules influence regulatory choice see Rosenbluth and Schaap (2003). Singer
(2007) explores the principal-agent relationship between legislatures and financial regulators.
3 There is a broad literature focused on this question. See Simmons (1994) for a discussion of how independent
central banks privileged domestic price stability over other policy goals during the interwar years. Maxfield (1997)
shows that when isolated from political pressures, central banks in developing countries privilege long run over
short run outcomes. Cukierman (1992) demonstrates that while central banks are never truly independent, those
with broader discretion are more successful in moderating inflation, which improves long run macroeconomic
health.
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to balance both goals incentivizes central banks to pursue more expansionary policies than they
otherwise would, as Copelovitch and Singer show.
This logic can be made clear by considering how these institutions are likely to respond to
economic downturns. As aggregate demand falls, central banks tasked with maintaining price
stability stimulate the economy by lowering interest rates, thus making it more attractive for
banks to borrow from the central bank and lend to businesses and consumers. The desired result
is an increase in economic activity sufficiently large to restore money growth and thus maintain
price stability. Separate regulators, on the other hand, face mandates to promote financial
stability, not macroeconomic performance. If the economic downturn increases the chances
that creditors will default on their debt, regulators may restrict the risk-taking activities of
banks in order to improve the resilience of the financial system. In response, banks lend less and
increase liquid holdings such as hard currency. Because banks intermediate between the monetary
authority and the real economy, the result is that banks maintain higher capital adequacy ratios,
but monetary policy is less effective.
When regulatory authority and monetary authority are unified in central banks this dilemma
is easily resolved: central banks can credibly commit to provide liquidity to banks during down-
turns, so banks will not have to hoard the funds provided by the central bank to protect against
default risk4 . Instead, banks can continue to lend during downturns – increasing economic ac-
tivity and improving the effectiveness of monetary policy – while central banks provide liquidity
to the banking system – improving bank stability. Thus the tension between two policy goals is
lessened when monetary and regulatory authority are unified, and may make both more effective.
In fact, central bankers have explicitly made this argument when asking for regulatory authority.
In a January 13, 2010 letter to Chairman Dodd and Ranking Member Shelby of the U.S. Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke
wrote “Its supervisory activities provide the Federal Reserve information about the current state
of the economy and the financial system that, particularly during periods of financial crisis, is
valuable in aiding the Federal Reserve to determine the appropriate stance of monetary policy”
(Bernanke 2010).
By unifying monetary and regulatory authority, policy makers may hope to increase the
effectiveness of both. This may be difficult to achieve in practice, however. If policy tension is
lessened by unifying authority in a central bank, then banks in unified systems should maintain
lower capital ratios during economic downturns as they continue to lend funds rather than
hoard them. Indeed, this may be the goal of policy, as central banks attempt to stimulate a
4 This is not to say that inter-agency cooperation is impossible when authority is split, or that intra-agency
tensions are non-existent when it is unified. Merely that at the relevant margin the tension will be greater across
agencies than within them.
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damaged economy. But if those banks recognize that they will face fewer regulatory requirements
during downturns, then they have little incentive to improve their capital ratios and incur the
opportunity cost of foregone profits during economic expansions. In fact the incentives run in
the opposite direction. Central banks cannot make a credible commitment to withhold favorable
policies from banks during downturns, since such a policy would weaken the macroeconomy and
increase the risk of a systemic financial crisis. Banks expect central banks to fulfill their role as
“lender of last resort” in order to prevent a financial crisis. For this reason, banks regulated by
central banks have less incentive to insure themselves against default risk by maintaining high
capital ratios.
It is not immediately clear how this situation differs for banks regulated by a separate agency
with a single mandate to maintain bank stability. It is true that these agencies are not responsible
for macroeconomic performance, and can make a credible commitment to not provide liquidity
to needy firms during a downturn as they do not possess that authority, but banks may still
receive access to funds from central banks as part of monetary policy. But separate regulators
cannot rely on central banks to do their job for them by tailoring monetary policy to the needs
of the banking sector. Instead, regulators must promote the security of the banking system on
their own. Nor can banks expect much preferential treatment. As Copelovitch and Singer show,
central banks with a single mandate to maintain price stability are less inclined to sacrifice
that goal by enacting bank-friendly policies. Because neither separate regulators nor banks
can be certain that central banks will provide adequate liquidity to the banking system during
downturns, they face incentives to build a stronger capital cushion during economic expansions.
Moreover, because separate regulators bear no responsibility for macroeconomic performance
they may be tempted to over-regulate by requiring banks to raise capital above their official
obligations in anticipation of future defaults. A recent example of this are the “stress tests” con-
ducted by regulators in the United States in the Spring of 2009 as part of the Supervisory Capital
Assessment Program (SCAP). SCAP examined 19 of the largest bank holding companies in the
United States to assess their ability to withstand losses under a range of economic scenarios. At
the start of SCAP none of the 19 firms had capital ratios below the legally-mandated minimum.
Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the program 10 of the 19 firms were required to raise capital
“buffers” in excess of the minimum capital requirements, totaling $185bn, to protect against
the possibility of defaults under possible future adverse economic scenarios (Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System 2009). It is very expensive to raise capital quickly, especially
during downturns when the risk premium increases. If banks anticipate strict regulation during
downturns they may prefer to maintain high capital ratios during expansions when capital is
relatively inexpensive rather than be forced to raise capital when it is most expensive.
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In any case, principal-agency dynamics lead us to expect central banks to regulate less rigidly
than separate agencies, since regulating strictly would restrict their ability to fulfill their mandate
to manage the macroeconomy. Separate regulators operating with a single mandate have no such
conflict, so we should expect them to regulate more rigorously all else equal. This observation
leads to the central hypothesis of this paper: banks in systems where regulatory and monetary
authority are unified in a central bank will protect themselves against default risk less than
banks in systems where authority is split, so capital ratios will be lower in unified than in split
systems. Because banks operating in unified systems expect and receive preferential policies
from regulatory central banks, they act less prudently than they otherwise would, and so exploit
moral hazard.
This moral hazard arises from the need to maximize the effectiveness of monetary policy, and
is thus distinct from the hazard that may arise from fiscal bailouts of systemically important, “too
big to fail” financial institutions, but occurs for similar reasons. Fiscal bailouts of systemically-
important financial institutions sometimes occur because policy makers have strong incentives
to avoid the immense economic devastation that follows financial crises at all costs. In a crisis,
policy makers can prevent financial collapse by redistributing public funds to private institutions.
But if they issue a bailout guarantee then banks are incentivized to take larger risks than they
otherwise might. This could lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy where banks know that governments
must support struggling banks or suffer major economic damage and so take larger risks. If the
risks pay off the banks make large profits. If the risks do not pay off, then the losses will be
socialized by governments. Banks operating with a government guarantee may adopt a “heads I
win, tails you lose” attitude towards risk. To avoid this, governments refrain from making such
guarantees explicit.
As the quote at the beginning of this article indicates, in times of crisis bankers cannot be
sure whether they will receive government support through fiscal policy or whether they will
be allowed to fail5 . For example, during the recent financial crisis some American financial
institutions were given access to special funding sources from the government and were allowed
to off-load damaged parts of their balance sheets to the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve
(e.g. Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup) while others were forced
into liquidation or closure (e.g. Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Washington
Mutual). Ex ante none of the banks could know which would be saved and which would not
be, so gambling on a government bailout would be exceptionally risky. There is no indication
that banks in the recent crisis made that gamble, likely because the stakes were so high and the
5 The political choice of whether to bail out insolvent firms or enforce closures is carefully analyzed in Rosas
(2006).
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downside risk if they were wrong was enormous.
Regulatory central banks cannot make a credible commitment to withhold policies favorable
to banks, however. If they preside over a financial collapse they risk the removal of their authority.
Therefore, as Copelovitch and Singer show, they have reason to favor bank stability over price
stability with monetary policy, and so pursue policies that benefit banks. The discussion above
extends their logic to suggest that just as regulatory central banks respond to the incentives
given them by institutional mandate, private banks respond to the same mandate by acting
more riskily, with the understanding that regulatory central banks must privilege their interests.
Data Analysis
To this point I have argued that banks will act less prudently in systems where monetary
and regulatory authority are unified in a central bank because of moral hazard endemic to those
systems. In this section I describe the test of that hypothesis by examining the relationship
between location of regulatory authority and bank behaviors in 30 OECD member countries
from 1990-20076 .
The dependent variable is bank behavior, measured by the total risk-weighted capital ade-
quacy ratios (CAR) of banks. These data come from the Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope database,
which contains data on bank characteristics and behaviors for over 29,000 financial firms. Of
these, I limit my analysis to commercial banks, investment banks, savings banks, cooperatives,
and bank holding companies in the OECD7 . Because I am interested in how the location of cen-
tral authority affects banking systems at the national level, I collapsed the data on their means
by country and year. Therefore, my unit of analysis is yearly averages at the national level
of firm-level CAR data, which measures the actual capital adequacy ratios of banking systems
rather than any particular bank.
I choose to focus on CAR because the most common prudential regulations are mandated
minimum CAR. These are simply the ratio of a bank’s capital – comprised of Tier 1 capital
(usually including shareholder equity and disclosed reserves) and Tier 2 capital (usually including
undisclosed reserves and preferred stock) – to its risk, which is the probability that a bank’s
actual return on investment is lower than its expected return. Put another way, capital is the
6 Several countries entered the OECD during the sample period – Mexico in 1994; Czech Republic in 1995;
Hungary, Poland, and South Korea in 1996; Slovakia in 2000. I include these countries in the sample beginning
with the year of entrance. The results of the statistical analysis are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of these
countries, as shown in the appendix.
7 The full data set also includes central banks, clearinghouses, government credit institutions, trust corpora-
tions, microfinance institutions, securities firms, mortgage brokers, private asset management companies, non-
banking credit institutions, and multi-government banks. I exclude these firms to focus on the types of financial
institutions subject to common prudential regulations like those in the Basel Accords.
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difference between assets and liabilities, representing owners’ equity and bank profits, while risk
represents the default potential of bank assets, which are weighted according to the perceived
riskiness of asset type8 . Therefore, CAR = CapitalRisk−WeightedAssets . Less risky assets, such as
cash or government bonds, require less capital to protect against potential default. More risky
assets, such as unsecured loans, require larger capital cushions. Because of the risk-weighting
mechanism there are two ways for banks to improve this ratio: by increasing the numerator (i.e.
boosting the capital stock) or by reducing the denominator (i.e. holding fewer risky assets). An
example of the former is issuing more stock; an example of the latter is increasing cash holdings.
Table 1 shows common risk-weights for different types of assets.
Table 1: Common Risk Weights by Asset Type
Type of Asset Risk Weight
Cash
0%
OECD sovereign debt
Claims on OECD banks
20%Securities issued by government agencies
Municipal debt
Residential mortgages 50%
Unsecured loans
100%Claims on non-OECD banks
Other non-securitized debt
Because of skewness in the data due to the presence of outliers I transformed these country-
year CAR averages onto the logarithmic scale9 . While this was done for statistical reasons, such
a transformation also has attractive interpretive qualities: coefficients of non-logarithmic input
variables, such as my primary explanatory variable, can be interpreted as percentage-changes in
CAR corresponding to unit changes in the input variable (i.e. semi-elasticities); coefficients of log-
transformed input variables, such as some economic controls, can be interpreted as percentage-
changes in CAR corresponding to one-percent changes in the input variable (i.e. elasticities). It
8 While measurement of risk varies somewhat cross-nationally, the Basel Accords provide common guidelines
for risk calculation.
9 The skewness is created almost entirely by Japan, in which CAR values are at least two standard deviations
above the mean in nearly half the years in the sample. I do not know whether this occurs because of measurement
error, differences in reporting standards in Japan, or whether those values are appropriate. Japan does use a
broader definition of capital than other OECD countries, but they remain within Basel guidelines. However,
excluding Japan from the sample, as I do in the appendix, does not change the substantive results and alters the
size of the effects very little. This remains true whether or not CAR is log-transformed.
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is often more intuitive to conceptualize percentage-changes in CAR rather than level-changes,
so a log-transformation of the outcome variable gives the analysis greater interpretive, as well as
statistical, leverage.
Table 2: Location of Bank Regulatory Authority in the OECD
Regulatory Central Bank EMU Nonregulatory Central Bank EMU
Australia1 No Austria Yes
Czech Republic No Belgium Yes
France2 Yes Canada No
Greece Yes Denmark No
Hungary No Finland Yes
Iceland3 No Germany4 Yes
Ireland Yes Japan No
Italy Yes Luxembourg Yes
Netherlands Yes Mexico No
New Zealand No Norway No
Portugal Yes Poland No
Slovakia No Sweden No
South Korea No Switzerland No
Spain Yes
Turkey5 No
United Kingdom6 No
United States7 No
1 The Reserve Bank of Australia regulated the banking sector until 1999. Therefore,
Australia is coded as having a regulatory central bank from 1990-1998, and nonregu-
latory from 1999-2007.
2 Regulatory authority in France is located in the Commission Bancaire, which includes
the Governor of the French central bank as well as members of the Treasury. Following
Goodhart and Shoenmaker (1995) and Copelovitch and Singer (2008), I classify the
Banque de France as a regulatory central bank.
3 The Bank of Iceland was regulator until the establishment of the Financial Supervisory
Authority in 1999. Therefore, Iceland is coded as having a regulatory central bank from
1990-1998 and nonregulatory from 1999-2007.
4 The German Bundesbank is responsible for some tasks involved in regulation, like
data gathering and dissemination, but regulatory authority ultimately resides with the
separate Federal Financial Services Supervisory Authority.
5 The Turkish Central Bank was primary regulator until 2000, when authority was
handed over to the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency. Therefore, Turkey
is coded as having a regulatory central bank from 1990-1999, and nonregulatory from
2000-2007.
6 The Bank of England regulated the banking sector until 1999, after which regulatory
authority was transferred to the Financial Services Authority. Therefore, the United
Kingdom is coded as having a regulatory central bank from 1990-1998, and nonregu-
latory from 1999-2007.
7 The Federal Reserve is one of several bank regulators in the United States, but does
share regulatory authority, and so fulfills the criteria necessary to be considered a
regulatory central bank.
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The primary explanatory variable is the location of bank regulatory authority, Regulator,
which is a dummy variable equal to one if a central bank possesses some or all bank regulatory
authority and zero if it does not10 . A description of which states have regulatory central banks
and which do not is in Table 2, and comes from the World Bank Bank Regulation and Supervision
survey data set11 . Where survey information was incomplete I supplemented the measure with
data from national regulatory authorities and from Copelovitch and Singer (2008). Because I
expect moral hazard to exist in states with a regulatory central bank, I expect Regulator to have
a negative relationship with CAR.
During the period from 1990-2007, four OECD countries transferred regulatory authority over
the banking sector12 . In all four cases regulatory authority was removed from central banks
and given to a separate regulator, and in all four cases mean capital adequacy ratios increased
following the transition, as shown in Table 3. This observation is consistent with the theory
presented above and with the simple cross-sectional relationship portrayed in Figure 1.
Table 3: Capital Adequacy Ratios Before and After Transition to Separate Regulator
Country Regulatory Central Bank Nonregulatory Central Bank
Australia 11.93% 14.11%
Iceland 13.01% 16.11%
Turkey 17.99% 30.01%
United Kingdom 16.06% 20.41%
An important political variable is membership in the European economic and monetary union
(EMU ). Twelve of the thirty countries in the sample joined the EMU during the sample period,
as indicated in Table 2. As part of EMU accession those states sacrificed much monetary policy
autonomy to the European Central Bank, which controls monetary policy in EMU countries
but does not regulate banking sectors. This presents a measurement challenge: how should
EMU countries with regulatory central banks be coded? Central banks that do not control
10 Following previous literature, I classify a central bank as regulatory if it has complete or partial regulatory
authority (Copelovitch and Singer 2008).
11 Available at http://go.worldbank.org/SNUSW978P0, last accessed April 4, 2010.
12 Australia, Iceland, and the United Kingdom transferred regulatory authority from their central banks to a
separate agency in 1999. Turkey did so in 2000. The timing of these transitions corresponds with the fallout from
the East Asian financial crises in the late-1990s, perhaps indicating that policy makers in those countries were
responsive to the turmoil caused by that episode. That question is not directly examined here, however.
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monetary policy do not face the same policy tradeoff as those that do: regulatory central banks
in EMU countries can make credible commitments to not use monetary policy to aid banks
during downturns because they do not control the levers of monetary policy. Therefore, the
moral hazard that arises when monetary and regulatory authority are unified should be lessened,
if not eliminated, in EMU economies.
However simply creating a new variable that combines location of regulatory authority and
EMU membership risks conflating two very different effects13 . Regulatory central banks in the
EMU may not control monetary policy, but they still function as the lender of last resort for
domestic financial firms, as the ECB has explicitly refused to take that responsibility (Walter
and Bergheim 2008). Banks may expect more assistance when regulated by central banks than
otherwise, but less than if that central bank had control over monetary policy. Therefore, I
include a binary variable equal to zero for all country-years in which a state was not a member
of the EMU and one for all country-years in which a state was a member of the EMU. Because
central banks in EMU states do not control monetary policy, banks cannot rely on them for
preferential monetary policies during downturns, but may still rely on other mechanisms provided
by lenders of last resort, so the potential for moral hazard is lessened but not eliminated by EMU
membership. As such, I expect a positive association between EMU and CAR. I also interact
Regulator and EMU to test whether the effect of regulatory location is conditioned by EMU
membership.
I also include a variable measuring the financial Openness of a country. A commonly-used
measure of openness is the Kaopen composite index created from the IMF’s Annual Reports on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (Chinn and Ito 2008). The index has four
components: capital account restrictions, presence of multiple exchange rates, current account
restrictions, and requirements to surrender export proceeds. I include Openness because states
may seek to protect domestic firms by limiting the amount of competition they face from foreign
firms. Previous literature assumes that this type of profit-padding regulation will induce domestic
banks to act more prudently than they would if they faced stronger competition (Rosenbluth
and Schaap 2003). If this is true, then we should see a significant negative relationship between
Openness and CAR, meaning that banks lower their capital adequacy ratios and take on more
risk when faced with foreign competition. While I agree that banks facing more competition may
take on more risk to stay competitive, I also expect banks protected from foreign competition
to face fewer constraints from market discipline. So I expect a weakly negative, statistically
13 I do test the effect of a combined measure on CAR as a robustness check, and report the results in the
appendix. As expected, the effect of the combined measure is weaker than that of Regulator because of the
inclusion of positive EMU effects, but it remains significant and negatively signed.
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insignificant relationship between Openness and CAR14 .
The devastating consequences of banking crises should also affect banks’ CAR. These are
infrequent events, occurring in only about 2% of country-year observations, but have profound
effects on CAR by weakening the capital base of the banking sector. To account for the effects
of banking crises, I include a dichotomous variable, Bank Crisis, indicating whether a country is
suffering from a systemic banking crisis during a given year. This variable comes from the IMF’s
Financial Crisis Episodes database, described by Laeven and Valencia (2008). There is a risk of
conflating cause with effect, however; lower CAR leave banks more susceptible to crisis, but the
occurrence of crisis will also deteriorate CAR by eroding a bank’s capital base. Because I am
trying to control for the effects of crises rather than explain them, I remain agnostic about the
causal direction between CAR and Bank Crisis, but expect a significantly negative association
between them15 .
Table 4: Predicted relationships between independent variables and CAR
Variable Direction
Regulator Negative
EMU Positive
Openness Negative
Bank Crisis Negative
Growth Positive
Inflation Inflation
Current Account Positive
I also include several macroeconomic control variables, taken from the World Bank World
Development Indicators database, that could affect bank behaviors. I include the logged GDP
Growth rate, logged Inflation rate (measured by GDP deflator), and current account balance as
a percentage of GDP (Current Account). I expect Growth to be positively correlated with CAR,
meaning that I expect banks’ capital adequacy ratios to deteriorate during economic downturns,
but I do not expect this relationship to be large or significant. The “profit-padding” regulations
literature discussed above assumes a positive relationship between Inflation and CAR, but the
14 While all four components of Kaopen might have some effect on bank behavior, it is also possible that
the effect of capital account restrictions – which is most relevant to my argument – could be masked by the
inclusion of other restrictions in the index. Therefore, I also estimated the model isolating component measuring
capital account restrictions, which is a binary variable coded zero if capital account restrictions are not present
in a country-year and one if there are. I report those results in the appendix. I also report results from a
model excluding Openness entirely, because of concerns about nonrandom missingness in Kaopen, which does not
include values for Luxembourg.
15 I also ran the model without Bank Crisis and report the results in the appendix.
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present analysis questions that assumption, so I expect a weakly negative relationship between
Inflation and CAR. Countries that run large, persistent current account deficits increase the risk
of financial crises (Reinhart and Rogoff 2008), which should be negatively correlated with CAR,
so I expect Current Account to be positively associated with CAR.
Model and Method
I estimate a time series cross-sectional (TSCS) econometric model to test the association
between the independent variables on CAR. The potential problems with TSCS models are
well-documented: researchers much choose between using fixed and random effects to control
for unit-level processes, how to incorporate invariant or sluggish regressors in the face of unit
effects, whether to include a lagged dependent variable as a regressor given the risks of bias
from heteroskedasticity. In this section I discuss those issues, and my methodological choices
concerning them.
The following represents a typical time series cross sectional (TSCS) regression model:
Yit = αi +Xitβ + it
Where ‘Yit’ is the outcome variable for country ‘i’ at time ‘t’, Xitβ is the product of a matrix
of independent variables and their coefficients, and it is a residual term.
Mundlak (1978) argues that “any matrix combination of the ‘within’ and ‘between’ effects is
generally biased”, and the direction and size of that bias is indeterminate. This occurs because
TSCS data includes two components within the stochastic term, so it = ui + eit. The ui
component varies nonrandomly across panels but not time. This variance is often called “unit
effects” or “unobserved heterogeneity”. The eit component varies randomly across panels and
time. When ui 6= 0, which it almost always does in TSCS data, pooled OLS coefficient estimates
will always be biased and inconsistent because of unmodeled endogenous processes.
Because of this, many have concluded that using “fixed effects” – which are mathematically
equivalent to dummy variables for each panel – to control heterogenous variation within units is
the best solution because it eliminates bias and inconsistency in coefficient estimates. Still, there
are problems: coefficients estimated using fixed effects are inefficient, which can create problems
of interpretation and inference, especially in smaller samples. Perhaps more severely, while
coefficients estimated using fixed effects do provide unbiased, consistent estimates of effects within
panels, they do this by completely eliminating the variance across panels. Nevertheless, I include
fixed effects to eliminate potential bias from un-modeled non-stochastic processes operating
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within panels.
I cluster standard errors on the fixed effects parameter estimates to correct any potential
autocorrelation. There is strong debate over whether to also include a lagged dependent variable
(LDV) as a regressor. While including a LDV can potentially produce biased and inconsistent
parameter estimates due to heteroskedasticity (Achen 2000), the bias is often trivial and is in
the “right” direction, as it leads to more conservative estimates of the effects of regressors on the
regressand and is thus a more rigorous test of the impact of variables (Keele and Kelly 2006).
More significantly, exclusion of a LDV may produce omitted variable bias, and may produce
too-large parameter estimates of regressors if they are collinear with the LDV. Other approaches
to this problem, such as the Kiviet correction, generally demand a very high price in terms
of model flexibility and confidence in standard errors for very moderate gains in reducing bias
(Beck and Katz 2009). Because it is impossible to know ex ante whether the potential bias from
including an LDV is more severe than the potential bias from excluding it, I estimate the model
with and without the LDV. As we will see below, and as we might expect, the differences in the
two estimations are noticeable in intensity of effect, but not in direction or significance.
Results
Table 5 shows the results from the TSCS regression, which are robust to alternative specifi-
cations as mentioned above and shown in the appendix. Remember that the dependent variable
is transformed to the logarithmic scale, so coefficients represent percentage-changes in banks’
capital adequacy ratios for unit-changes (non-logged variables) or one-percent changes (logged
variables) in the input variables. Models 1 and 2 exclude the lagged dependent variable (LDV),
models 2 and 4 include the the interaction term Regulator*EMU. Additionally, the inclusion
of the LDV in models 3 and 4 drops Mexico from the sample because of missingness in the
dependent variable for most of the sample period16 .
The first thing to notice is that the direction and significance of the independent variables
are largely stable across model specifications. As expected, the models that include a LDV have
smaller coefficient estimates for explanatory variables (except Growth); nevertheless, qualitative
effects and strong significance remains across the models. This is impressive, since a fixed
effects model with a LDV and clustered standard errors represents a very demanding test of the
data. The stability of the coefficients across model specifications – including robustness checks
16 Overall, missingness is not a large concern: only 26 of the 503 country-years are missing in the dependent
variable, and these are concentrated in Mexico (13 of 26) and the years 1990-1991, which are the earliest in the
sample (11 of 26). Despite concerns over casewise deletion, multiple imputation is not a viable option because
the missingness in the sample is nonrandom.
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discussed above and reported in the appendix – also boosts overall confidence in the results.
Table 5: Determinants of Bank Capital Adequacy Ratios
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Regulator -0.365*** -0.363*** -0.117** -0.117**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
EMU 0.101** 0.145** 0.044** 0.042
(0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)
Regulator*EMU . -0.074 . 0.004
(0.09) (0.04)
Openness 0.036 0.041 -0.032 -0.033
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Bank Crisis -0.427* -0.426* -0.353* -0.353*
(0.23) (0.23) (0.18) (0.18)
Growth (log) -0.020 -0.021 -0.026* -0.026*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Inflation (log) -0.026 -0.025 0.018 0.018
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Current Account (% GDP) 0.027*** 0.026** 0.008** 0.008**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
LDV . . 0.604*** 0.604***
(0.09) (0.09)
Constant 2.990*** 2.978*** 1.269*** 1.269***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.26) (0.26)
Observations 390 390 366 366
Number of Countries 29 29 28 28
R2 0.156 0.157 0.487 0.487
TSCS regression with fixed effects.
Robust standard errors, clustered on panels, in parenthesis
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In all models banking systems that are regulated by their central banks have significantly
lower CAR than those regulated by a separate agency. In both models 1 and 2, the semi-elasticity
of Regulator is below -0.36, meaning that ceteris paribus banking systems regulated by central
banks have 36% lower CAR than banking systems with a separate regulator. These effects are
statistically significant at the 1% level, and are consistent with the hypothesis presented above.
In models 3 and 4 the inclusion of the LDV shrinks the size of the coefficients as we would
expect, but the effect is still quite large: banks operating under regulatory central banks have
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ratios 11.7% lower than those that do not, all else equal, and we can reject the null hypothesis
that there is no difference caused by the location of regulatory authority at the customary 5%
level of significance in both models. Note that the coefficients of the Regulator*EMU interaction
term are both small and are statistically indistinguishable from zero, so we may be confident
that the effect of Regulator on CAR is not conditioned by EMU.
The difference in between the size of coefficient estimates of Regulator in the LDV and
non-LDV models is large. What is the substantive importance of these effects? Median CAR
across the sample is 15.25%, so the 36% average decrease associated with having a central bank as
regulator would reduce median CAR to 9.76%, which is below the 10% minimum to be considered
“well-capitalized” by the United States Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation but above the
minimum of 8% mandated by the Basel Accords. Even after including the LDV, which biases
coefficient estimates downwards, median CAR under regulatory central banks falls to 13.5%. In
other words, these effects are non-trivial.
Membership in the EMU also has the predicted impact on bank behaviors. On average,
and holding the other variables at their means, EMU membership increases CAR by roughly
4% in the LDV models and 10% - 14.5% in models 1 and 2. These estimates reach statistical
significance at the traditional 5% level except in model 4. This provides further support for
the argument that moral hazard is discouraged when the tension between financial stability and
macroeconomic flexibility is stronger. But the small, insignificant effect of the interaction term
indicates that the assuagement of moral hazard in EMU countries with regulatory central banks
is a matter of degree.
We cannot reject the null hypothesis that capital account openness has a non-zero effect on
bank behaviors, however, nor are the coefficients stable: the coefficient switches signs depending
on the inclusion of the LDV. This provides evidence against the claim made by Rosenbluth and
Schaap (2003) that profit-padding regulations are sufficient to curb the capital-to-risk ratios of
banks. In fact, this shows that banking systems appear to be unresponsive to financial protec-
tionism. There may be other policy justifications for placing controls on capital movements, but
this analysis indicates that promoting safety in the banking sector may not be one of them.
As expected, banking crises are associated with a large deterioration of capital adequacy
ratios, ranging from 35% - 42% across the models, and all estimates are significant at the 10%
level. So there is support for the expectation that banking crises are strongly associated with
declining capital ratios, but our conclusions cannot be more specific than that. It may be that
banking crises cause deterioration of CAR, or that lower CAR make banking crises much more
likely. In fact, both are likely true, but disentangling these effects is not possible from this
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analysis.
The effects of the macroeconomic control variables on CAR are small. Inflation has no
statistically significant effect on bank behaviors at traditional levels. Somewhat strangely, the
negative effect of Growth on CAR increases in size and significance when the LDV is included
as a regressor, but the largest effect is substantively small: a one percentage-point increase in
GDP growth is associated with a 2.6% decrease in CAR, all else equal. In models 1 and 2 the
effect does not reach traditional significance levels. The current account balance as a percentage
of GDP is significant across all model specifications, but the substantive impact is also small: a
one percentage-point increase in CurrAcct is associated with a roughly 2.5% increase in CAR in
models 1 and 2, and a 0.8% increase in models 3 and 4.
Conclusion
In this paper, I argue that the location of regulatory authority is a major determinant of bank
behaviors. Because of the counter-cyclical nature of monetary policy and the pro-cyclical nature
of regulatory policy, if regulatory authority is separate from monetary authority then a state’s
policy makers may be working against themselves. Central banks that also regulate the banking
sector will often be willing to enact monetary policies that favor the banking sector. This can
lead to moral hazard, where banks expect preferential policies and so act less prudently than
they otherwise might. The results of a time series cross-sectional statistical model analyzing
capital adequacy ratios in OECD countries support this hypothesis.
Specifically, I find that capital adequacy ratios are higher when central banks possess reg-
ulatory authority over the banking sector. I also find that banking systems where monetary
authority has been given to an outside agency, such as those in member states of the European
economic and monetary union, have higher capital-to-risk ratios. Both findings support the
theory that moral hazard exists when macroeconomic authority and regulatory authority are
unified.
These results call into question the contention that central banks may be able to induce
prudence from banks by enacting policies favorable to them. Copelovitch and Singer (2008) argue
that regulatory central banks will favor the needs of banks by providing them with easy access
to funds, trading off some inflation in the process. Rosenbluth and Schaap (2003) argue that
this sort of “profit-padding” policy reduces the necessity of excessive risk-taking for profitability,
and thus encourages banks to act less riskily. While this analysis is broadly congruent with
the former, it disagrees with the latter. In fact, it presents the opposite case; if banks expect
preferential policies they may choose to act less prudently than they otherwise would.
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These findings have several important implications for policy. First, states often re-examine
their regulatory structures following financial crises. Some have argued that locating regulatory
authority in a central bank can eliminate institutional rivalries and lead to better-coordinated
policy (Bernanke 2010). I agree with this assessment, but argue that the relaxation of policy
tension can create moral hazard. This can make locating regulatory authority in a central
bank that also manages the macroeconomy counter-productive from the perspective of financial
stability.
On the other hand, there may be a benefit to unifying policy authority: increased macroe-
conomic flexibility. While I do not directly test that hypothesis here, the analysis relies on the
argument that policy tension is relaxed in an environment where an independent central bank
also regulates the banking sector. If this is true, regulatory central banks should have greater ca-
pacity to make macroeconomic adjustments when needed. So long as the relaxed policy tension
does not lead to a financial crisis, states may be better off when regulatory and monetary au-
thority are unified. If national leaders feel that they can protect against financial crises in other
ways, for example through strict non-discretionary prudential standards, then giving regulatory
authority to central banks may have positive results.
There are limitations to the analysis presented here. The greatest challenge comes from the
limitations of statistical analyses of time series cross-sectional data sets. Namely, the fact that
the presence of unit effects in panel data requires controls that make cross-sectional comparison
difficult. Since much of the variation of the primary explanatory variable is cross-sectional, this
limits the generalizability of the results. This problem is partially overcome by the fact that the
location of regulatory or monetary authority varies in more than half of OECD countries during
the sample period. Moreover, even a cursory look at the cross-sectional data, as in Figure 1,
demonstrates that states with regulatory central banks typically have lower capital adequacy
ratios than those that do not. These different ways of analyzing the data all point in the same
direction. Put together, they make a compelling case.
Another potential challenge is that, while the analysis is consistent with the theory that
moral hazard exists for banks operating in states with regulatory central banks, it is impossible
to test for a latent concept like moral hazard directly. It is possible that there is some other
mechanism that is also consistent with the statistical results. For example, perhaps the patterns
we observe in the data are not a result of moral hazard, but rather efficiency-seeking. If separate
regulators systematically over-regulate, they may sacrifice economic performance in the process.
Regulatory central banks may pursue more bank-friendly policies, but if these do not increase
the risk of financial crisis then they may be better able to manage their domestic economies
without incurring too much downside risk. It may seem obvious that better-capitalized banking
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sectors are less prone to crisis, but there may be tipping points or other conflating factors that
are not analyzed here.
Finally, the analysis presented here offers avenues for continued research. If a tradeoff exists
between financial stability and macroeconomic flexibility, what determines how this tradeoff
is resolved? Why would leaders in some states, but not all, choose stability over flexibility?
Presumably leaders will be held accountable for policy choices in both areas, so how do they
choose which goal to privilege? Do they understand the effects of the choices they make? One
interesting implication from the analysis here is that all institutional reforms have moved away
from unified authority: twelve states ceded monetary independence by joining the EMU during
the sample period, seven of which had regulatory central banks. Four states switched the location
of regulatory authority during the sample period, and all of them set up a regulator separate
from the central bank. Given that financial crises have become more common and more severe
in the post-Bretton Woods period, perhaps leaders are choosing stability over flexibility in their
domestic economies. Further research is needed to shed light on this question.
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APPENDIX
Table 6: Determinants of Bank Capital Adequacy Ratios, including Regime Type
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Regulator -0.399*** -0.400*** -0.109 -0.109
(0.12) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07)
EMU 0.111*** 0.141** 0.042** 0.043
(0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)
Regulator*EMU . -0.051 . -0.002
(0.09) (0.04)
Openness 0.035 0.039 -0.027 -0.026
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Polity2 0.141 0.141 0.019 0.019
(0.12) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07)
Bank Crisis -0.373* -0.373* -0.340* -0.340*
(0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17)
Growth (log) -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.019
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Inflation (log) -0.023 -0.022 0.021 0.021
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Current Account (% GDP) 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.008* 0.008
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
LDV . . 0.614*** 0.614***
(0.09) (0.09)
Constant 1.631 1.619 1.028 1.027
(1.17) (1.17) (0.76) (0.76)
Observations 375 375 351 351
Number of Countries 28 28 27 27
R2 0.184 0.185 0.495 0.495
TSCS regression with fixed effects.
Robust standard errors, clustered on panels, in parenthesis
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The models presented as above, with a control for regime type (Polity 2) taken from the
Polity IV data set. Regulator loses significance in models 3 and 4 at traditional levels, but only
barely: in model 3 the P-value = 0.107; in model 4 the P-value = 0.109. Other than that
difference, the size and direction of all effects is consistent with the models in Table 5, except
that Growth and Current Account lose significance in the models that include the LDV.
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Table 7: Determinants of Bank Capital Adequacy Ratios, Excluding Japan
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Regulator -0.357*** -0.356*** -0.107** -0.107**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
EMU 0.099** 0.142** 0.043** 0.039
(0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)
Regulator*EMU . -0.071 . 0.006
(0.09) (0.04)
Openness 0.035 0.041 -0.031 -0.031
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Bank Crisis -0.297 -0.296 -0.214 -0.214
(0.22) (0.22) (0.13) (0.13)
Growth (log) -0.023 -0.024 -0.025* -0.024*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Inflation (log) -0.034 -0.032 0.016 0.016
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Current Account (% GDP) 0.028*** 0.027** 0.008** 0.008**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
LDV . . 0.613*** 0.614***
(0.09) (0.09)
Constant 2.953*** 2.942*** 1.220*** 1.221***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.26) (0.26)
Observations 384 384 361 361
Number of Countries 28 28 27 27
R2 0.145 0.146 0.490 0.490
TSCS regression with fixed effects.
Robust standard errors, clustered on panels, in parenthesis
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
An alternative specification, excluding Japan due to concerns about outlier effects. The
substantive effects change very little, except that EMU becomes insignificant in model 4 and
Bank Crisis loses significance in all models (P-values range from 0.104 - 0.194).
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Table 8: Determinants of Bank Capital Adequacy Ratios, Different Measure of Openness
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Regulator -0.356*** -0.355*** -0.131* -0.131*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07)
EMU 0.112** 0.151* 0.037 0.058
(0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04)
Regulator*EMU . -0.056 . -0.030
(0.10) (0.05)
Openness 0.021 0.024 -0.029 -0.027
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Bank Crisis -0.770*** -0.771*** -0.554** -0.555**
(0.27) (0.27) (0.24) (0.24)
Growth (log) -0.020 -0.020 -0.032** -0.032**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Inflation (log) -0.048* -0.048* 0.011 0.012
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Current Account (% GDP) 0.029*** 0.028** 0.007* 0.007
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
LDV . . 0.563*** 0.562***
(0.09) (0.09)
Constant 3.070*** 3.065*** 1.377*** 1.377***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.27) (0.27)
Observations 354 354 333 333
Number of Countries 28 28 28 28
R2 0.201 0.202 0.495 0.495
TSCS regression with fixed effects.
Robust standard errors, clustered on panels, in parenthesis
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This specification isolates the restrictions on the capital account component from Kaopen. In
this specification EMU loses significance at normal levels in models 3 and 4 (P-values are 0.132
- 0.143, respectively), and the effect of Bank Crisis increases. Other results change very little.
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Table 9: Determinants of Bank Capital Adequacy Ratios, Excluding Bank Crisis
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Regulator -0.347*** -0.345*** -0.098** -0.098**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
EMU 0.097** 0.143** 0.039* 0.037
(0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)
Regulator*EMU . -0.077 . 0.003
(0.09) (0.04)
Openness 0.046 0.052* -0.022 -0.022
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Growth (log) -0.021 -0.022 -0.027* -0.027*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Inflation (log) -0.025 -0.024 0.018 0.018
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Current Account (% GDP) 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
LDV . . 0.622*** 0.623***
(0.09) (0.09)
Constant 2.956*** 2.944*** 1.183*** 1.183***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.28) (0.28)
Observations 390 390 366 366
Number of Countries 29 29 28 28
R2 0.127 0.129 0.463 0.463
TSCS regression with fixed effects.
Robust standard errors, clustered on panels, in parenthesis
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The exclusion of Bank Crisis has very little effect on the substantive results: EMU loses
significance at traditional levels in model 4, and Openness gains significance in model 2. Besides
that, there is little discernible difference in the size or significance of effects.
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